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This paper presents an original study on the economics of a link-based Toll and Subsidy 
Scheme (TSS) on a general transportation network. Different from a traditional congestion pricing 
scheme, the combination of toll and subsidy is found to be able to serve more planning purposes 
simultaneously, such as efficiency, fairness, and public acceptance. We first demonstrate that on a 
one-origin or one-destination network, a pareto-improving, system-optimal and revenue-neutral 
TSS always exists and can be obtained by solving a set of linear equations. Recognizing that such 
a scheme may not always exist for a multi-origin network, we then define the maximum-revenue 
problem with pareto-improving constrains to find the maximum possible revenue collected by 
the toll and subsidy scheme with optimal arc flows and non-increasing origin-destination travel 
costs. We discover that the problem is actually the dual problem of a balanced transportation 
problem, which can thus be solved efficiently by existing algorithms. At the end of the paper, a 
numerical example with a small synthetic network is provided for the comparison of toll and 
subsidy scheme with other existing toll schemes in terms of OD travel disutilities. 
 
Keywords: toll and subsidy; self-sustainable; pareto-improving; revenue-neutral; no-toll equilibrium; 
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1. Introduction 
The concept and study of road pricing has a long history that dates back to the 1920s (Smith, 
1979; Dafermos, 1973; Pigou, 1920; Beckmann et al., 1955). The economic theory behind it is the 
use of a price mechanism to reallocate a scarce resource, road capacity, so as to reduce the 
efficiency loss due to travelers’ selﬁsh-routing behavior (Roughgarden, 2005; Correa et al., 2004; 
Roughgarden, 2003; Anderson and Renault, 2003; Roughgarden and Tardos, 2002). Among 
existing pricing schemes, marginal-cost pricing is known to achieve a socially optimal (SO) ﬂow 
pattern even though travelers still minimize their own travel costs (Yang and Huang, 1998; Yan 
and Lam, 1996; Akamatsu and Kuwahara, 1989; Smith, 1979). The marginal toll is easy to 
calculate, although its realization may not be straightforward. This pricing scheme, however, has 
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two obvious flaws: first, in most cases it increases the travel disutility of road users unless the 
tolls collected were redistributed back to the road users in some way; second, it results in two 
kinds of unfairness: 1) the anonymous pricing scheme usually incurs undesirable benefit 
distribution over the population because of road users’ differences in their value-of-time, and 2) 
people traveling from different OD pairs may experience substantially different changes of travel 
disutility after the toll is imposed, depending on the levels and locations of tolls. 
Motivated by reducing the total cost incurred by road users, Dial (2000, 1999) proposed the 
minimal-revenue congestion toll and provided a fast solution algorithm for obtaining the toll in a 
multi-origin network with fixed demand. Compared with the first-best, marginal cost toll, it 
lowers the total travel cost of the road users but some of the travelers may still experience an 
increase in travel cost. And for travelers from different OD pairs, their travel disutility may still 
vary significantly. Another direction to lower the travel cost is to directly return the revenue 
collected by the marginal-cost toll to the travelers by a monthly “credit allowance” (Kockelman 
and Kalmanje, 2005; Gulipalli and Kockelman, 2008). The allowance is uniformly redistributed to 
the drivers regardless of their travel distances. Such a redistribution scheme would pit long-
distance commuters against short-distance commuters because the former subsidizes the latter, 
which causes another form of inequity other than price discrimination. 
To address the fairness issue, “Pareto-improving” pricing schemes were introduced, which not 
only improve the performance of the network (not necessarily to the level of the first-best 
solution), but also reduce the travel disutility of travelers from every OD pair (Law-phongpanich 
and Yin, 2009; Yang and Zhang, 2002). Unfortunately, under general network settings, the link-
based pareto-improving congestion toll scheme does not always exist if the toll rate is restricted 
to be nonnegative. Moreover, since the whole problem is usually formulated as an optimization 
problem with equilibrium and equity constraints, it is often difficult to obtain the global 
optimum, if there is one, in a large network. To overcome the intrinsic shortcoming of the single 
pricing scheme, most recently Guo and Yang (2010) studied a combination of congestion pricing 
and revenue refunding schemes in general transportation networks. By implementing an 
additional OD and class-based refunding scheme, the two targets of pareto-improving and 
system optimal can be simultaneously achieved. The pareto-improving OD-based refunding 
scheme is attractive in the way that it always exists despite of the network topology. But 
detecting every traveler’s trip OD on everyday might be a problem in reality. The same person 
may have multiple trips within one day, each has different origin and destination, making the 
refunding procedure even more complicated. Besides, there could be privacy issues when the OD 
information is extracted for the refunding purpose for individual travelers. 
Road pricing schemes aim at obtaining a desirable flow distribution over the network by 
charging a toll on all or a selective set of links, hence increasing the travel costs of all or some of 
the travelers. We can call such schemes as managing traffic with a stick. Instead of forcing 
travelers to shift from an overly utilized road to an underutilized road with a stick (i.e. toll), can 
we offer them a carrot (i.e. subsidy) when they use the underutilized road? Both schemes can 
change travelers’ route choices but the effects on the traveler’s surplus are opposite. Compared 
with traditional congestion tolls, the combination of toll and subsidy has several advantages: 1) 
the scheme faces less public resistance because everyone might benefit from it; 2) it adds 
additional degree of freedom to achieve simultaneously different planning goals, such as equity, 
efficiency and self-sustainability; and 3) it functions also as a revenue redistribution scheme. It is 
well known that allocating the revenue collected by the toll could be a controversial issue. To 
road users, the congestion toll is merely a variant of a lump-sum tax. In contrast, the toll and 
subsidy scheme is able to directly return the revenue to road users. The scheme itself can break 
even, which means the total revenue given out to the road users could all be covered by the 
revenue collected from the users. 
In the literature the toll and subsidy strategies has been investigated within various contexts. For 
example, Liu et al. (2009) studied the possibility and conditions of pareto-improving congestion 
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pricing schemes on a bi-modal network. They considered a continuously distributed VOT under 
static network equilibrium and concentrated on the revenue-neutral pricing. Nie and Liu (2010) 
extended their work by focusing on the existence of a self-financing and pareto-improving toll 
scheme under different distributions of VOT. They considered a two-mode simple network, and 
the system is not necessarily optimal under the toll schemes. Hearn and Ramana (1998) studied 
the toll pricing framework on a general transportation network with identical travelers. Under 
what they call the ”Robinhood” scheme, network users collect a payment on some of the links 
and pay a toll on others, indicating that it is equivalent to a toll and subsidy scheme. They 
claimed that the system-optimal toll set can be obtained by solving a linear program problem. 
And under the “Robinhood” scheme, the total revenue collected by the system optimal toll can be 
zero. Recently Chen and Yang (2012) investigated a bi-objective optimization problem where a 
toll cum rebate scheme is utilized to obtain both system optimum and emission minimization. 
Yet in their study, the toll cum rebate scheme is not required to be pareto-improving in terms of 
travelers’ cost. 
This paper further explores the properties of the toll and subsidy scheme (TSS) on a general 
network with fixed demand and identical travelers. We try to answer several intriguing 
questions that have never been answered before: does there exist a toll and subsidy scheme that 
can simultaneously achieve the following objectives: socially optimal, pareto-improving and 
revenue-neutral? If the answer is yes, does it depend on the network topology? Moreover, if it 
exists, can we find a fast solution algorithm to obtain it? And if not, can we relax some 
assumptions and obtain a second-best solution? To answer those questions, we start with 
discussing an alternative ﬁrst-best pareto-improving TSS. Then the existence of a system optimal, 
pareto-improving and revenue-neutral TSS will be proven on a single origin or single destination 
network. For a network with multiple origins and destinations, we develop the model and the 
algorithm to solve the TSS. Numerical examples with sample networks are also provided to 
demonstrate the resulting equilibrium and effectiveness of the algorithm, and to compare the TSS 
with other existing toll schemes in terms of OD travel disutility. 
2. Definitions 
We consider a directed network ( , )G N A= , denoted by a set of consecutively numbered nodes, 
N , a set of consecutively numbered links, A  and a set of OD pairs, W . A directed link ( , )i j  has 
two endpoints i  and j . On this network, each OD pair is connected by a set of paths through the 
network. The OD demands are denoted by a column vector d  with entries ,wd w W∈ . 
Let ( )ij ij Ax x ∈=  and ( )ij ij At t ∈=  represent the link flow and link travel time vectors, we have 
( )ij ij ijt t x= . For the no-toll equilibrium (NTE) to be unique, we assume ( )ijt •  is strictly increasing 
and convex. ( )ij ij Aρ ρ ∈= is denoted as the column vector of link-based toll rates. When ijρ  is 
positive, users traveling on link ( , )i j will pay ijρ amount of toll, while if ijρ  is negative, users 
will receive | |ijρ  amount of subsidy for using link ( , )i j . ( )ij ij ij ijc t x ρ= + , represents the 
generalized link travel cost (Here without loss of generality we assume that the factor to transfer 
time to money, which we call the “value of time”, is equal to 1). We also define µ  as the column 
vector of OD travel disutilities. 
Throughout the paper, the superscript “ m ” represents the marginal-cost (MC) based solution, 
“ ~ ” over the symbol represents system-optimal (SO) solution and “ − ” over the symbol 
represents the solution under NTE. 
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3. The alternative System-Optimal (SO) and Pareto-Improving (PI) TSS 
It’s well known that if the toll rate of every link is charged to its marginal travel cost, the link flow 
pattern is system-optimal (SO), i.e. the total system cost is minimized. The toll internalizes the 
external cost of road users and is always nonnegative, which takes the form 
 
( )
0ij ijmij ij
ij
dt x
x
dx
ρ = ≥          (1) 
However, if we do not require the toll rate to reflect the marginal cost, there are an infinite 
number of schemes that can produce the optimal link flows when the OD demands are fixed. 
Given any SO TSS ρ , one straightforward way to obtain an alternative TSS is to proportionally 
change all the links’ travel costs, following the equation below 
 ( ) ( 1)( ) ,tρ α α ρ ρ= − + +   0 1α< ≤        (2) 
Under such a TSS, the link travel cost becomes 
 ( ) ( )c t tρ α α ρ= + = +           (3) 
Here we assume 0 1α< ≤ . When 1α = , the toll pattern reduces to original system-optimal TSS, 
ρ ; and when 0α → , all the toll rates become negative and all the generalized link travel costs 
approach to 0. From Eq. (3) we observe that all the link travel costs under the alternative TSS are 
changed by the same percentage, α . Correspondingly, all the path travel costs are also changed 
by α , so that the equilibrium remains unchanged. Therefore, the link flows are still optimal 
under the TSS defined by Eq. (2). With this observation, we give Lemma 1. 
 
Lemma 1. On a general network with fixed OD demands, we can always find a TSS that is pareto-
improving and system-optimal. Furthermore, under such a TSS, every link retains a positive generalized 
travel cost. 
 
Proof. To prove Lemma 1 we only need to construct such a TSS based on a general network. 
Suppose under some scheme, ρ , the system is optimal and every link’s generalized travel cost is 
positive (for example, the marginal-cost TSS). If all the OD travel disutilities under ρ  are less 
than the OD travel disutilities under NTE, the SO TSS ρ  is already pareto-improving. 
Otherwise, there must exist one OD pair which experiences a travel disutility increase under ρ , 
i.e. 
 { , } 1w
w
min w Wµ
µ
∈ <

         (4) 
We also know that as long as a TSS ( )ρ α  follows Eq. (2), it is system-optimal because it will not 
change the link flow pattern under ρ ; To be pareto-improving, let 
 { , }w
w
min w Wµ
µ
= ∈

          (5) 
Since we reduce the travel cost on every link proportionally by adjusting the toll rate until the 
travel disutility of the OD pair which experiences the highest percentage increase of travel 
disutility is equal to the NTE travel disutility, all the other OD pairs will thus experience 
nonincreasing travel disutility under ( )ρ  , which indicates that ( )ρ   is pareto-improving. And 
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because  is always greater than 0, from Eq. (3) we know that the generalized travel cost of every 
link under ( )ρ   is still positive.□ 
Though a SO and PI TSS can be easily derived in this way, the flaws are also obvious: first, the 
spatial inequity still exists, because such a TSS changes all the OD travel disutility by the same 
percentage. Due to the OD distribution and network topology, the travel disutility changes from 
NTE to SO among different OD pairs may still vary significantly; second, decreasing all the link 
costs by a same percentage could come with a price: considering the extreme case that the lowest 
OD demand experiences the highest percentage of travel disutility increase under the marginal-
cost TSS, to be pareto-improving, we have to subsidize all the other OD pairs by giving out 
money to a large number of road users who just experience very small percentage of travel 
disutility increase or even travel disutility decrease. The revenue collected by the TSS could easily 
go negative so that for supporting such a TSS, a large amount of external subsidy may be needed. 
Thus one may ask that can we find a TSS which is both pareto-improving and self-sustainable (the 
revenue is nonnegative)? We shall answer this question in the following sections, by first looking 
into the case of single-origin networks, then extending the result to multi-origin, multi-
destination networks. 
4. The case of a single-origin network 
4.1 A network with one OD pair 
We first consider the simplest case in which there is only one OD pair in a general network. We 
have the following conclusion for this special case 
 
Lemma 2.There always exists one SO, PI and revenue-neutral TSS, ρˆ , when the network has only one 
OD pair1 . 
 
Proof. We know that the system cost under marginal-cost TSS is always less than or equal to the 
system cost under NTE. That is 
 ( ) ( )T Tt x x t x x≤           (6) 
Because there is only one OD pair, the OD travel disutility under NTE equals 
 
1 ( )Tt x x
d
µ =           (7) 
And the OD travel disutility under the marginal-cost TSS becomes 
 
1 ( ( ) ( ) )T m Tt x x x
d
µ ρ= +            (8) 
 
If µ µ≤ , the marginal-cost TSS is just the scheme we want to find, with 1α = . Otherwise, from 
Eqs. (7) and (8) we have 
                                                        
1We note that Lemma 1 can also be directly derived from Guo and Yang’s work Guo and Yang(2010), 
because if there is only one OD, the TSS proposed here is equivalent to a toll plus OD-based refunding 
scheme deﬁned in their paper. 
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 ( ) 0m T xρ >           (9) 
Let 
 
( )
( ) ( )
T
T m T
t x x
t x x x
α
ρ
=
+
 
  
         (10) 
Under a TSS defined by (2) we know that now the OD travel disutility 
 
1 1ˆ ( ( ) ( ) ) ( )T m T Tt x x x t x x
d d
µ α ρ µ= + = <           (11) 
which implies that the TSS is pareto-improving. And from the previous discussion, since ρˆ  
satisfies definition (2), it will not change the flow pattern under the marginal-cost toll, which 
means the link flow pattern is system-optimal. Moreover, utilizing (2) and (10), the total revenue 
collected by ρˆ , R , can be calculated by 
 ˆ ( 1) ( ) ( ) 0T T m TR x t x x xρ α α ρ= = − + =          (12) 
which implies that the TSS ρˆ  is revenue-neutral. The proof is complete.□ 
Actually in the one OD case, by proportionally lowering down the travel cost on every link, the 
system cost saved by the TSS is totally returned to the road users, so that every road user is able 
to experience a reduction of travel disutility. However, if there are multiple OD pairs, since some 
of the link flows are shared by different OD pairs, it is not easy to find an anonymous link-based 
TSS that is SO, PI and revenue-neutral. Furthermore, if the numbers of OD pairs are sufficiently 
large, such a TSS may not even exist. In the following, we will first discuss a special network, the 
single-origin or single-destination network, and then study the general situation with multiple 
origins and destinations. 
4.2 The SO-NTE TTS on a single-origin network 
We first define a TSS as a SO-NTE TSS under which the link flow pattern is system-optimal but the 
OD travel disutilities are the same with those under NTE. As long as the NTE is not fully efficient, we 
know that the revenue of SO-NTE TSS is always positive. We also notice that according to Eq. (2) 
we can always reduce the toll rate on each link in the network so as to return the revenue to 
travelers. Therefore, once we find a SO-NTE TSS, we can always ﬁnd an alternative TSS that is 
pareto-improving and revenue-neutral. 
We associate every node in the network with a node potential, iπ . iπ  can be calculated by the 
deﬁnition that iπ  is equal to the length of the shortest path distance from the origin node o  to 
node i . We can see that under this deﬁnition, all the other nodes’ potentials are relative values, 
depending on the node potential of the origin node, oπ  , which can be arbitrarily chosen. If wπ  is 
the node potential of the destination node w , from the definition, w o wπ π µ− =  is the OD travel 
disutility of the OD pair w under equilibrium. For a given set of node potentials π , we define the 
reduced cost of an link ( , )i j  as ( )ij ij ij i jc t
π ρ π π= + + − . We know that if a TSS reproduces the 
SO link ﬂow pattern, x , the reduced costs have to be zero on the ﬂow-bearing links and 
nonnegative on unused links, that is 
 
 
0, 0
0,
ij ij
ij
c if x
c Otherwise
π
π
=       >
 ≥   

         (13) 
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To find the SO-NTE TSS (if it does exist), we construct the following Maximum-Revenue problem 
with Pareto-Improving constraints (MRPI) 
 ( , )max ij ij
ij
xρ π ρ∑           (14) 
subject to 
 0, 0, ( , )ij ij i j ijt x i j Aρ π π+ + − =   ∀ ≥   ∈        (15) 
 0, 0, ( , )ij ij i j ijt x i j Aρ π π+ + − ≥   ∀ =   ∈        (16) 
 ,w o w w Wπ π µ− ≤   ∀ ∈         (17) 
 
The objective function is maximizing the total revenue collected by the TSS. (15)-(16) restrict the 
network flow pattern to be optimal. Constraint (17) states that the TSS ρ  has to be pareto-
improving. The revenue reaches its upper-bound when constraint (17) is binding, indicating that 
if the solution to the problem is its upper-bound, the solution is just the SO- NTE TSS we are 
looking for. Otherwise, the SO-NTE TSS does not exist. To transform the greater-than-or-equal 
constraints to equality constraints, we define 0ijs ≥  as a nonnegative slack variable associated 
with each link ( , )i j A∈  and 0wλ ≥  as a nonnegative slack variable associated with each 
destination node w W∈ . In addition, we define a zero-ﬂow indicator ijz  to be 
 
1, 0,
0, .
ij
ij
if x
z
Otherwise
     =
=    
         (18) 
By utilizing the zero-ﬂow indicator and slack variables, the problem can be rewritten as 
LP1: 
 ( , , , )max s ij ij
ij
xρ π λ ρ∑           (19) 
subject to 
 0, ( , )ij ij i j ij ijt z s i j Aρ π π+ + − − =   ∀ ∈       (20) 
 0,i i i i Wµ π λ− − =   ∀ ∈         (21) 
 , 0s λ ≥           (22) 
 ,ρ π ∈           (23) 
We notice that here the toll rates and node potentials are unconstrained, which means that by 
solving LP1, the link generalized travel cost could be negative if the toll rate goes negative and 
sufficiently low. Then naturally, one may ask is it possible that the TSS induces some negative 
cycle? To answer the question we give the lemma below 
 
Lemma 3. Under the TSS scheme provided by LP1, the network contains no negative cycle. 
 
Proof. From the definition of reduced cost ijc
π , for any directed cycle P , we have 
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( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , )
( , )
(( ) )
( ) ( )
( )
ij ij ij i j
i j P i j P
ij ij i j
i j P i j P
ij ij
i j P
c t
t
t
π ρ π π
ρ π π
ρ
∈ ∈
∈ ∈
∈
= + + −
= + + −
= +
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑
      (24) 
From Eq. (21) we know that at the equilibrium, 0ij ij ijc z s
π = ≥ , ( , )i j A∀ ∈ , which implies That 
( , )
0ij
i j P
cπ
∈
≥∑ . From Eq.(24) we have that 
( , ) ( , )
( ) 0ij ij ij
i j P i j P
t cπρ
∈ ∈
+ = ≥∑ ∑ , thus we conclude that as 
long as the TSS scheme ρ  is the solution of LP1, the network does not contain a negative cycle.□ 
Obviously, the upper-bound of LP1 is equal to the difference of system costs between NTE and 
SO. 
4.3 Dual linear program 
To ﬁnd the dual problem of LP1, we ﬁrst restate LP1 in matrix notation. Let 
 
| | | |I A A= × ,    the identity matrix; 
| | | |J W W= × ,   the identity matrix; 
,( )
l N
l ij ij Aδ
∈
∈∆ = ,    the network node-link incidence matrix, where 
,
1, ,
1, ,
0,
l ij
if i l
if j l
otherwise
δ
     =
= −     =
   
 
( ) ∈= ∆ = n n Nb x b   trip demand to each node n , where  
         
0, ,
0, ,
0, .
i
i
i
b if i is an origin node
b if i is a destination node
b otherwise
>              
 <          
 =                           
 
,( )
i N
i j j Wσ
∈
∈Λ = ,    diagonalization of the network node-OD incidence matrix, where 
,
1, ,
1, ,
0, .
i j
if i is an origin node
if i is a destination node
otherwise
σ
             
= −          
                             
 
From the above definitions, we immediately have 
 d x bΛ = ∆ =           (25) 
 
,( )
a A
a a a AZ z
∈
′ ′∈=     diagonalization of z  indicators, where 
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,
, ,
0, .
a
a a
z if a a
z
otherwise′
′     =
=       
 
Then the primal problem LP1 can be rewritten as 
 ( , , , )max
T
s xρ π λ ρ          (26) 
subject to 
 
0
0 0
T
T
tI Z
sJ
ρ
π
µ
λ
 
  −∆ −     =    −Λ   
 
 

       (27) 
 , 0s λ ≥           (28) 
 ,ρ π ∈           (29) 
 
The dual problem to Eqs.(26)-(29) is 
DP1: 
 1 2 1 2min ( , )
T TP y y t y yµ= − +         (30) 
subject to 
 1
2
0
0
0 0
0 0
I x
y
yZ
J
= 
 ∆ −Λ =    − ≥ 
  ≥ 

         (31) 
From the first constraint we readily obtain that 1y x=  . The fourth constraint restricts 2y  to be 
nonnegative. And since 1y x=  , 1 0Zy− =  always holds. Thus the third constraint is redundant. 
The second constraint gives that 2 1y y x bΛ = ∆ = ∆ = . We know that | | | |yΛ = = the number of 
Destination nodes, thus 2y  is unique. From Eq. (25), 2y  is just equal to the OD demand vector d . 
Substituting all the constraints, the objective function becomes 
 ( ) T TP y d t xµ= −            (32) 
The first term in Eq. (32) is the total travel cost under user equilibrium and the second term is the 
total travel cost under SO. Thus the result of primal linear program LP1 is always the upper-
bound of the problem, which implies that the SO-NTE TSS always exists, as well as the SO, PI 
and revenue-neutral TSS. 
The proof is similar for the single-destination multi-origin network. The algorithm is exactly the 
same except that we need to set the potential of the destination node to be 0 and the potentials of 
other nodes as the shortest path distance from this node to the destination node. To sum up, we 
give the following theorem 
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Theorem 1.On a single-origin or single-destination network, we can always find a TSS, ρˆ , which has the 
following properties: 
i) Every road user experiences the same percentage improvement of the travel disutility; 
ii) The link ﬂow pattern is socially optimal; 
iii) The revenue collected by the toll is 0, i.e. the TSS is break-even (i.e., revenue neutral). 
 
Under the SO-NTE TSS given by LP1 we have 
 0,i i Wλ =   ∀ ∈          (33) 
Thus the SO-NTE scheme can be solved by the following group of equations 
 
0, 0
,
0
ij ij i j ij
i i
o
t x
i W
ρ π π
π µ
π
+ + − =   ∀ >
 =                      ∀ ∈
 =                                   

       (34) 
The extreme situation happens when every node in the subgraph except the origin node is a 
destination node. Then the SO-NTE TSS is unique. 
Theorem 1 gives us some good news: compared with the minimal-revenue pricing scheme 
proposed by Dial (1999), the advantages of the TSS here are obvious: it not only further lowers 
the revenue and as a consequence lowers the travel cost of each traveler, but also mitigates OD-
specific price discrimination. Furthermore, the TSS does not require every link to be associated 
with a toll when the number of destination nodes is relatively small. Assume the number of 
nodes in the network is n and w of them are destination nodes, then the freedom of the problem 
(34) is ( 1 )n w− − , which means at most ( 1 )n w− − links can be free links. 
4.4 A numerical example 
Here we provide a numerical example (Figure 1) of the famous network of Braess’ Paradox 
(Braess, 1968). 
Suppose node 1 is the origin node, nodes 2, 3, 4 are all destination nodes. The OD demands 
12 2d = , 13 1.5d = , 14 4d = . Solving SO and NTE we have the optimal link travel time and OD 
travel disutility under NTE 
 
1
3
2
4
10
x13
10+x
32
2+25x34
50+x12 10x
24
 
Figure 1  Network of Braess’ paradox 
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13
1412
1234
1324
32
26.96
79.2254.80
, 53.3031.89
42.0128.04
10.00
t
ut
ut
ut
t
   
                 =       =          
      
     





       (35) 
We also have the total system costs under NTE and SO, which are respectively 486.47 and 452.74. 
Setting 452.74 / 486.47 0.93α = = . We calculate the objective OD travel disutility under the 
pareto-improving and revenue-neutral TSS 
 
14
12
13
ˆ 73.72
ˆ 49.60
ˆ 39.10
µ
µ
µ
   
   =   
   
   
         (36) 
which are also the node potentials for destination nodes 2, 3, 4 (we set the node potential of the 
origin node 1 to be 0). By solving a group of linear equations, we obtain the pareto- improving, 
system-optimal and revenue-neutral TSS, which are shown in the parentheses in Figure 2. The 
underlined number associated with each node is the node potential under the TSS. 
5. The case of multi-origin networks 
5.1 The MRPI problem 
Similar with the one-origin network, for the multi-origin network we can still formulate the 
MRPI problem for finding a SO and PI TSS with the lowest possible external subsidy required. 
The SO and PI TSS is not necessarily self-sustainable now, since we have only one single set of 
toll rates to deal with the trips from all the origins. However, in case the maximum revenue is 
negative, it’s still meaningful to look for a SO and PI TSS, with the minimum possible subsidy 
required, which is able to eliminate the deadweight loss of the selﬁsh-routing behavior and make 
everyone better-off simultaneously. By using superscript k  as origin index, we ﬁrst enrich the 
notations as below. 
 
1
3
2
4
26
.9
6
(1
2.
14
)
10.00
(0.51)
31.89(2.74)
54.80(-5.20)
28
.0
4
(-
3.
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)
39.10
73.72
49.60
0
 
Figure 2  Resulting toll rates 
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:K     origin-node set, 
: ( )k k k Kn n Nπ π
∈
∈    , node potentials for origin k , 
: ( )k k k Kij ij As s
∈
∈    , link slack variables for origin k , 
( ): kk k k Kw w Wλ λ
∈
∈
    , OD slack variables for each destination nodes with origin k , 
: ( )k k k Kn n Nb b
∈
∈    , the OD matrix, 
,: ( ) k
k k i N
i j j W
σ ∈
∈
Λ     , the diagonalization of the network node-OD incidence matrix for origin k , 
,( ):
k k a A
a a a AZ z
∈
′ ′∈    , the diagonalization of 
kz indicators, 
 
Without loss of generality, we investigate the two-origin case, since the general pattern for n 
origins can then be easily revealed from the two-origin case. The primal linear program for the 
two-origin case can be written in matrix notation in the following form. Here we add a 
reasonable assumption that the generalized link travel cost after the TSS cannot be negative, i.e. 
0tρ + ≥ , so that people will not experience lower travel cost when they travel longer. 
 ( , , , )max
T
s xρ π λ ρ          (37) 
subject to 
 
1
1
2
2
1
11 1
2
22 2
1
2
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 ( ) 0 0 0 0
0 0 ( ) 0 0 0
T
T
T
T
tI Z
tI Z
s
J
s
J
ρ
π
π
µ
µ
λ
λ
 
 
  −∆ −   
    −∆ −     =    −Λ     
−Λ     
 
 
 


    (38) 
 , 0s λ ≥           (39) 
 0tρ + ≥           (40) 
 
Let 0tθ ρ= + ≥ , which is the generalized link travel cost. Substituting θ , we have the 
equivalent formulation 
LPn: 
 ( , , , )max
T
s xθ π λ θ          (41) 
subject to 
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1
1
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2
1
11 1
2
22 2
1
2
00 0 0 0
00 0 0 0
0 ( ) 0 0 0 0
0 0 ( ) 0 0 0
T
T
T
T
I Z
I Z
s
J
s
J
θ
π
π
µ
µ
λ
λ
 
 
 ∆ −   
    ∆ −     =    −Λ     −Λ     
 
 
 
    (42) 
 , , 0sθ λ ≥           (43) 
From Lemma 1 we know that the SO and PI TSS always exists and the problem has an upper-
bound which is equal to the difference of system travel time costs between NTE and SO. Thus the 
linear program LPn and its dual are both feasible and bounded and have the same value. From 
Eqs. (51)-(43), the dual problem becomes 
 1 1 2 22 2min ( ) ( ) ( )
T TP y y yµ µ= +        (44) 
subject to 
 
1
1
12
2
11
1
22
2
21
2
0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
I I x
y
y
Z
y
Z
y
J
J
≥ 
 ∆ −Λ =  
 ∆ −Λ = 
  − ≥  
 − ≥ 
   ≥ 
  ≥ 

       (45) 
From the first three constraints, we have 1 1 2 22 2y y xΛ + Λ ≥ ∆ . The last two are nonnegative 
constraints. The other constraints are just redundant. The problem can be transformed into a 
simplified version 
DPn: 
 1 1 2 22 2min ( ) ( ) ( )
T TP y y yµ µ= +        (46) 
subject to 
 1 1 2 22 2  y y xΛ + Λ = ∆          (47) 
 1 22 2, 0y y ≥           (48) 
where constraint (47) becomes an equation because for the minimization problem DPn with all 
the coefficients positive, the constraint is always binding. By observing DPn, we notice that 12y  
and 22y  can be interpreted by the OD flows respectively belonging to origin 1 and origin 2. Thus 
the dual problem of LPn is actually equivalent to a balanced transportation problem: finding the 
optimal pattern of the distribution of goods from several points of origin to several different 
destinations, with the fixed OD travel costs. In addition, if the solution of DPn is greater than the 
total system cost under SO, the SO and PI TSS is self-sustainable, and vice versa. 
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Theorem 2.On a multi-origin network with fixed demands, the MRPI problem is equivalent to a single-
commodity balanced transportation problem with the same demand to each node and the OD travel costs 
equal to the OD travel disutilities at NTE. 
 
Thus it becomes very easy to find out if the PI, SO and revenue-neutral TSS exists. We just need 
to solve DPn and compare the value to the total system cost under SO. If it’s greater, the PI, SO 
and revenue-neutral TSS exists, and vice versa. Since the transportation problem is a special case 
of a linear program, it can be readily solved by any linear programming algorithms, like the 
simplex method. However, the special structure of it allows us to solve it by faster, more 
specialized algorithms than the simplex. The only difficulty of solving the original problem LPn 
is to find kZ  , the origin-specific zero-flow indicators, since it is not explicitly given by the 
traditional traffic assignment software packages. Fortunately, there is a convenient way to 
calculate it. The procedure has been proposed by Dial (2000), which follows a simple logic: 
finding the origin-stratified node potentials kiπ  under the system-optimal marginal-cost link toll 
rates mρ  and corresponding link flow pattern, x . Then 
 
0, 0,
1, .
m k k
k ij ij i j
ij
if x
z
otherwise
ρ π π  + + − =
= 
                       
  
       (49) 
5.2 Lowest toll rates 
Actually the MRPI problem may have multiple solutions. All of them can maximize the total 
revenue with decreasing OD travel disutilities but the toll rate levels associated with the links 
may vary quite differently. For example, if one path contains two links which are complementary 
to each other, one can raise the toll rate on one link as high as she/he wants and just reduce the 
credit rate on the other one correspondingly, without changing the travel cost of the whole path. 
Practically, people may want to find the SO and PI toll rate set with the lowest-possible absolute 
values. To find the lowest toll rates we can follow two steps and in each step we need to solve a 
linear program: In the first step, we solve the dual problem of MRPI. We assume the value of 
MRPI is minP  and the total SO travel cost is TC . We then set 
 
 
min
min
, ,
, .
TC if P TCTC
P otherwise
    ≥= 
    
        (50) 
We also define another variable 0m ≥  as the upper-bound of the toll rates, i.e. m tθ ≤ +  ; In the 
next step, to find the lowest toll rates we solve the following linear program 
LCPI: 
 
( , , , , )
min
s m
m
θ π λ
          (51) 
subject to 
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 
1


   (52) 
 , , , 0s mθ λ ≥           (53) 
where −1 is a column vector with all the entries equal to −1. The value of the problem LCPI 
actually gives the lowest-possible upper-bound of the toll rates that are either with the minimum 
subsidy or revenue-neutral. And because the upper-bound of the toll rate is minimized based on 
the maximized revenue, implicitly, the lower-bound of the toll rate is also limited. The TSS itself 
remains socially-optimal and pareto-improving. 
5.3 A numerical example 
For comparison, we use the multi-origin network from Dial (2000) in our numerical example. The 
network node-OD incidence matrix, the system-optimal link time and marginal-cost tolls are 
respectively shown in Table 1 and Figure 3. 
Table 1:  OD matrix 
O/D 3 4 Sum 
1 10 20 30 
2 30 40 70 
Sum 40 60  
2
5 7
3
6 8
(2,11)
(6,33)
91 4
(5
,1
2)
(6,18)
(6,24)
(6,
43)
(8,26)
(7
,3
2)
(8,30)
(4
,2
6)
(3
,3
5)
(9,35)
(3,25)
(8
,3
9)
(4,11)(9
,2
0)
(4,36)(2
,1
9)
 
Figure 3: The 9-node network 
 
Figure 4 shows the NTE link time. 
By solving NTE we have 
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13
14
23
24
24.85
23.70
24.16
25.03
µ
µ
µ
µ
   
   
   =
   
   
  
         (54) 
Substituting the NTE OD travel costs and OD demands into DPn, we have 
 13 14 23 24min ( ) 24.85 23.70 24.16 25.03P y y y y y= + + +     (55) 
2
5 7
3
6 8
14.29
8.94
91 4
5.
17
7.91
6.26
6.8
5
9.53
7.
00
8.00
4.
78
4.
48
9.24
5.39
8.
00
9.004.
00
2.004.
00
 
Figure 4: NTE link time 
 
subject to 
 
13
14
23
24
1 1 0 0 30
0 0 1 1 70
1 0 1 0 40
0 1 0 1 60
y
y
y
y
    
    
    =
    
    
    
        (56) 
 0y ≥            (57) 
The value to the problem is 
 min ( ) 2428.3P y =          (58) 
which is also the value of the primal problem LPn. By solving the SO problem we know that the 
total system-optimal travel cost is min2253.9 P<  , which implies that for this 9-node network, the 
pareto-improving and revenue-neutral TSS exists. And the maximum revenue the TSS is able to 
collect is 2428.3 − 2253.9 = 174.4. 
To find the toll rates, we first obtain the origin-specific flow-bearing subgraphs and node 
potentials, which are shown in Figure 5. Without loss of generality, we set the potentials of the 
origin nodes to be 0. 
The solution to LPn is not unique, which is good because this leaves us more room to achieve 
other goals, like pursuing the lowest possible toll rates, the TSS with least number of links to be 
charged or the TSS with equity or emission constraints. 
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Figure 6 shows the solution with the lowest-possible toll rates, which, as we have discussed, is 
the solution to LCPI. All the toll rates in the network are between −4.33 and 2.39. Compared with 
the MC toll and MR toll in Table 2, we observe that the TSS produces a nonincreasing travel cost 
for every OD pair. The revenue of the TSS is zero. 
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Figure 5: Subgraphs, node potentials and generalized cost under MC toll 
 
It’s worth noting that in this case if we restrict the toll rate to be nonnegative, making the 
problem to be a SO and PI toll problem, the primal problem becomes infeasible. Therefore, this 9-
node network does provide a counter example to show that the nonnegative SO and PI toll does 
not always exist in a multi-origin, multi-destination network. 
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Table 2  Comparison of OD travel disutilities: NTE, MC Toll, MR Toll and TSS 
OD pair NTE MC Toll MR Toll TSS 
1-3 24.85 36.95 30.6 21.08 0.85 
1-4 23.70 38.03 29.21 23.70 1.00 
2-3 24.16 36.76 32.96 20.92 0.87 
2-4 25.03 37.85 31.57 23.54 0.94 
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Figure 6 The pareto-improving and revenue-neutral TSS and node potentials 
6. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the properties of an innovative toll and subsidy scheme on a 
transportation network with fixed OD demands. We have two major findings from this study: 
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first, for one-origin or one-destination network, we can always find a TSS to be system-optimal, 
pareto-improving and revenue-neutral; second, for multi-origin and multi- destination network, 
the SO and PI toll scheme can be calculated by solving the MRPI problem. The toll scheme may 
not always be self-sustainable, depending on the network structure. The dual of MRPI is 
equivalent to the balanced transportation problem, so that we can solve the MRPI problem much 
faster than the traditional simplex method. 
Several advantages can be found of the TSS over traditional tolling schemes where the tolls are 
restricted to be non-negative. First, the additional freedom allowed by offering a toll on some 
links let us to achieve multiple planning objectives all at once. Second, the resulting  travel 
disutility for each OD pair is usually lower in the TSS than in a tolling scheme, and third, the TSS 
offers a natural (anonymous) way of distributing the revenue that can be less controversial, thus 
improving its chances of public acceptance. 
The study of the link-based TSS is still in its infancy. Future extensions of this study may discover 
more potentials of this system and lead to broader applications. We are currently pursuing the 
following extensions: 
1. Bi-objective TSS design. We know that for a multi-origin network, the pareto-improving TSS 
cannot always be self-sustainable. Under extreme situations the extra subsidy could be very high. 
Thus the planner may consider to reduce the subsidy by allowing a tolerable increase in OD 
travel disutility. Then the model has to be extended to tackle the following dual objectives: 
minimizing the subsidy and the OD travel disutility. 
2. Multi-class travelers and elastic demand. Needless to say, considering value-of-time 
differentiation and elastic demand make the problem more complicated. For elastic demand, the 
link flows can no longer be optimal under the TSS because the OD demands are changed. And 
for multi-class travelers the system planner has to make a balance between travel time cost and 
monetary cost. And it will be harder to achieve the goal of pareto-improving. 
3. Other planning purposes. In most cases the SO, PI and revenue-neutral TSS is not unique, 
providing extra flexibility for the system planner to realize further planning purposes, like 
finding the maximum number and optimal location of the free links. Capacity and environmental 
factors can also be involved as additional constraints. 
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